The Dustbin of History

Following the "immense amount" of arms decommissioned by the IRA, several questions suggest themselves.  First, why did decommissioning take so long to achieve?  Second, has the delay fatally undermined the chances of restoring devolved government to Northern Ireland under the terms of the Belfast Agreement?  Third, what role does the IRA continue to play in the Republican Movement's strategy for winning political power?

To deal with the first question, it is clear that the delay was part of a deliberate strategy to minimise the significance of the process as far as the rank and file of the movement was concerned.  Ed Moloney reminds us of the term "creative ambiguity" as a defining feature of the peace process and points out the fact that secrecy was essential as de Chastelain became convinced that otherwise the IRA would never have co-operated if it ever looked as if the IRA had been militarily defeated and been forced to surrender.  But it seems that "the secrecy allowed the IRA leadership to claim to its rank-and-file that decommissioning either hadn't happened or was of less significance than was being claimed". 

Moloney says that the IRA had codded the IICD in that what they had supposedly dumped was of no intrinsic value, but at the same time credibility had been bestowed.  Henry MacDonald makes a great deal of the question about whether any of the guns that were decommissioned dated from after 1996.  He suggests that there are about 200 hand guns in circulation, that were smuggled in from Florida in 1999, and he suggests that

It is these latter weapons that have been used and are likely to be used again in republican areas of Northern Ireland to threaten those who cross the IRA. One gun from the Florida arms route has already been fired - in 2000, when the IRA shot dead republican dissident Joe O'Connor in 2000.  A deal done without the knowledge of Gen de Chastelain, his team and the two churchmen has already been sealed between the British government and the IRA which will allow the latter to retain side arms for self-defence and quelling dissent. These handguns don't pose any threat to the British state, its police or soldiers, either in Northern Ireland or Britain. They do, however, remind those inside the nationalist community who are not "on message" with Sinn Féin that to challenge the hegemony of the republican movement can still have fatal consequences.

Professor Paul Bew wonders why we are now asked to believe that the IRA, which was so important to the Sinn Fein leadership a few months ago, has been placed in the dustbin of history. He argues that the Sinn Fein leadership sensed the fear of the Irish and British governments, in the face of the impending collapse of the whole Agreement project, and ruthlessly exploited it.

The British and Irish governments then made a decision to place the heaviest political burden of sustaining the process on the DUP in much the same way as they used to do with David Trimble. It is notable that the bank robbery has actually worked in the republican movement's favour. The three governments who supported the DUP's demand for photographic evidence of decommissioning have left the DUP in the lurch. The DUP, in so far as it was tempted last year by a deal, was tempted on the basis that it could claim vastly better terms than David Trimble. Indeed that they could claim that the photograph of IRA decommissioning constituted a justified humiliation and was therefore the greatest Protestant victory since 1690. Sops will come but the DUP is left with no aesthetic of victory left, no grand narrative.

 

So what are the chances of restoring devolved government to Northern Ireland?  Optimists will say that the DUP will have to go down the Trimble route if it is serious about making political progress and point to ambitious younger operatives like Nigel Dodds and Sammy Wilson.  But so far Paisley has been bitterly critical of the disarmament process.  David Trimble came to identify with the Good Friday Agreement and tried to promote it as a means of revamping and modernising unionism, in particular by attracting many middle class protestants who had opted out of politics since 1969.  His thinking may have been a little naive but at least he was prepared to take political risks for something he believed would lead to the betterment of Northern Ireland.  Having achieved hegemonic status within unionism by stoking protestant fears of republicans in government, the DUP is hardly going to take risks to save a process that attracts such hostility from its electoral base.

The two dominant political forces in Northern Ireland have effectively seen off their rival pro-Agreement competitors within their respective confessional blocs.  Until Paisley actually dies there is unlikely to be any softening towards the Agreement by the DUP.  What of the attitude of Sinn Féin towards devolution and government?  Fergus Finlay forcefully makes a point about the Republican Movement's ultimate aims:    

It is pursuing a political strategy which is aimed at making it the dominant political player in both jurisdictions on the island of Ireland. Until it reaches the critical mass it's aiming for, it won't take the risk of participating in government down here. In Northern Ireland it already has that critical mass - not only in terms of its size, but also in terms of the way government is structured. To coin a phrase, no Sinn Féin, no government.

As far as Finlay is concerned, Sinn Féin already holds the effective balance of power in Northern Ireland.  It may take a little longer to get a comparable grip on power in the Republic but it is a disciplined organization that is committed to effective control, both within its own organization and in the wider communities in the North where its writ runs.  Which brings us back to Henry MacDonald's point about the purpose of the hand guns.  It may be that the IRA emerge as a de facto police force within nationalist communities, whether or not provos will actually join the official police force.

Comments

[hensons]

I think your quite a bit of the mark here. the IRA were the undisputed police of the nationalist communities for decades and the july statment dictates that that role is to finish. politically it would be utterly impossible for IRA to continue in that role with the IMC peering on. british stratedy at the momenet is to bounce SF onto the policing boards. you need to look at the argument around the CRJ projects to see where the battle for policing is at. SF are trying a fudge on this and delaying the ineviatble for the ideological acid trip that joining the PSNI will entail for their grassroots and majority support.