Power, Principle and the Labour Party

I'm trying to steer clear of mentioning the Labour Party for a few days but Fergus Finlay's column in the Irish Examiner this morning caught my attention because it deals with something that has bugged me for years.   The gist of his argument is that the best way to counter any political advances the party might make is to question its commitment to its values.  Finlay is an old and battle-scarred Labour warhorse and knows all about the internal battles about coalition when he was a vigorous opponent of Labour Left and anti-coalitionism generally.  This explains why he says that "for years, Labour Party members seemed to value moral victories more than actual victories". 

Finlay is evidently frustrated by the way entering into government is always framed as trading principle for the perks of office:

Ask the leader of any political party in any democracy in the western world what he or she wants to achieve, and the answer will be, “I want to put my party in power, so that we can begin to deliver on the things we believe in”. Straightforward question, simple answer. It never raises an eyebrow. But if the leader of the Irish Labour Party were ever to say such a thing, in as straightforward a way as that, he or she would be drowned under the weight of political commentary predicting that the Labour Party was about to sell out its most fundamental values. Uniquely, the Labour Party is the only one in these islands, or anywhere else I can think of, for whom power and principle are not allowed to be compatible.

Socialists are always admired for their great ideals, once there is no chance of actually getting their hands on power, or even a share of power.  Well, I would prefer Labour to risk contamination in government and implement at least some of its programme even if it risked opprobrium from the likes of Vincent Browne.  All political parties have to make strategic trade offs between office, votes and policy so careful consideration has to be given to under what circumstances a party enters office, with which parties and on the basis of what programme.  The level and quality of internal party communication would greatly effect the context here and this would have to go beyond the top-down vertical mode of message delivery.

Labour Party leaders, as is well known, do not have complete autonomy to put the pursuit of office over (future) votes and policy.  In the past Labour has negotiated coalition agreements where some key policies were part of the programme for government.  Actual performance in government didn't always deliver them, especially during the Fine Gael-Labour coalitions in the 1980s.  In any case leaders know that they have to take their followers with them, so to speak, and must pay due regard to the ideological and symbolic aspects of the wider party culture if they are to retain any credibility with the extra-parliamentary party.  This is why I just cannot see Rabbitte blithely proposing a deal with FF after the next election. 

Comments

[WorldbyStorm]

But that being the case, and incidentally to some degree I share your thoughts regarding the exercise of power, it seems to me that the antipathy to joining an FF government amongst the membership is almost entirely artificial, even if seemingly deeply held. What great point of principle is lost by working with FF rather than FG? Our political culture, for all it's faults and flaws is vastly more transparent and less open to the sort of corruption that characterised the 1980s. I guess, not having been a member of Labour I just don't get it.

[Michael]

Having been part of those internal Labour Party debates I accept the debate can run like a broken record. The problem, however, is how you frame that debate. Mr. Finlay's frustration is misplaced for the question is not framed as trading principles for perks (indeed, it hasn't been for a long time). One of the problems is that the question is not framed at all. Labour members never ask themselves where they want to be in 10-15 years and, having come to a consensus on that goal, worked out strategies to achieve it and then, having worked out the strategies, debate the tactics - including coalition formation - to bring those strategies success.

Instead, with no medium-term framework, the debate is reduced to what do we after the next election. And Labour has done sometheing different in each election since 1989. Short-termism rules and it shows - an historical average of about 12% which is where we are now.

Here's a framework: within 10-15 years Labour should be the second largest party in the state and obvious leader of an alternative government. Now, how do we get there and what do we do and does that include participating in Governments led by the parties of the right? If it does, fine. But if not, then what do we do. In that context the debate would have more meaning.

Unless someone has a better place to be in 10-15 years.

[WorldbyStorm]

Which brings the debate right down to which of the two larger parties one attempts to weaken so that it can achieve that second place. And that runs into the sands of how to carry out such a strategy in a competitive PRSTV environment where transfers are needed from both. Personally, I still see 1992 as a point where serious inroads into FG could have been sustained. But perhaps not - and in any case well I remember while in DL just how cosy the relationship between them and FG was developing. So, ironically even had Labour stuck to their guns in coalition with FF they would ultimately have been exposed to a potential left challenge by a DL which remained outside of government.

And if one does target - say FG - then is the idea to work with them in government and somehow persuade the electorate of Labours superiority or is it to remain outside of government and throw brickbats from opposition, or alternatively go into coalition with FF just to prove that Labour is fit and able to govern.

I actually have considerable sympathy for Labours situation. Any of those options appears valid to me.